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RECENT
Wearing Religious Garb
On September 28, 1954, the state Circuit
Court of Franklin County, Kentucky, in the
case of Rawlings v. Butler [unreported],
ruled that sisters of the Roman Catholic
Church may teach in the public schools while
wearing their religious garments. The suit had
been filed on October 13, 1953, by the Rev.
James W. Rawlings, a retired Methodist minister and chairman of the Kentucky Free Public School Committee, an affiliate of the Protestants and Other Americans United for Separation of Church and State, and was directed
against the State Superintendent of Education,
Wendell P. Butler, and six county boards
which employ nuns as public school teachers.
The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, it being agreed that some 84
nuns were teaching in Kentucky public
schools and that they wore their religious garb
at all times while serving as employees of the
six county school boards. The plaintiffs
argued that the teaching by nuns wearing religious garments constituted a violation of the
requirement of separation of Church and
State and was therefore unconstitutional. In
a brief filed by the Attorney General on behalf
of the Superintendent of Education and the
nuns, it was argued that the barring of Catholic nuns from teaching in the public schools because of their religious garb would be a violation of their civil rights. The brief pointed out
that the only restriction on nuns teaching in
Kentucky public schools is that like all teachers, they may not teach "sectarian doctrine."
"So long as a Roman Catholic, Baptist or
Protestant teacher respects and observes these
constitutional restraints ... it is none of the
business of the school board to question his
or her religious faith or practice in their private life, or the clothes they wear privately or
publicly, so long as those clothes are decent. . . ." "The intent and purpose of the
Kentucky Constitution is to bar ecclesiastical
training in the public schools of Kentucky.

DECISIONS
You cannot acquire from these garbs any information as to the doctrines or ceremonial
practices of the denomination to which the
wearer belongs, and the wearing of these garbs
does not constitute instruction in religious
doctrine and practice." "For Kentucky school
authorities to interfere with qualified Catholic
sisters serving in our public schools because
they wear the uniform of their religious order
while teaching constitutes a persecution of the
persons who are members of that order on
account of their religion." In upholding the
rights of the nuns to teach, the court restated
the problem and its answer in the following
manner: "The only question here is, may sisters of the Catholic Church, while garbed in
the habiliment of nuns, teach in the public
schools? On this question we find nothing in
the Constitution, the statutes or the Kentucky
recorded cases that prevents such teaching."
The case as presented to the Kentucky
court did not, by any means, involve a novel
point of law. The question here under discussion has been before the courts of eight states
and the province of New Brunswick, Canada
in a total of eleven cases. It has further been
the subject of legislation in three states. The
earliest case dealing with the problem was
decided in 1894 by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania [Hysong v. School District of
Gallitzin Borough, 164 Pa. 629, 30 Atd. 482
(1894)]. It was there held that the wearing
of religious garb by nuns teaching in the public schools was not "sectarian teaching" and
hence was not violative of the constitutional
injunction against sectarian teaching in the
public schools. Within a year after this decision, the Legislature of Pennsylvania enacted
a law specifically prohibiting the practice approved in the Hysong case. The statute was
subsequently upheld as constitutional [Commonwealth v. Herr, 229 Pa. 132, 78 Atl. 68
(1910)] in a case involving a criminal indictment of school board directors who had
permitted nuns to teach in the public schools
in violation of the statute.

The second state to rule upon the question
was New York in two cases which arrived at
different, but reconcilable, conclusions. In
the first [Sargent v. Board of Education, 76
App. Div. 588, 79 N.Y. Supp. 127 (4th Dep't
1902)], it was stated that the garb "can in
no way affect the children injuriously while
they are receiving the secular instruction."
The second [O'Connor v. Hendrick, 184
N.Y. 421, 77 N.E. 612 (1906)], however,
held that while the wearing of religious garb
may not amount to the teaching of denominational doctrine as proscribed by the New York
Constitution (now Art. 11, §4), it gave rise to
an influence that was sectarian and hence it
was within the legitimate power of the Superintendent of Public Instruction to prohibit it
by departmental regulation. Despite the absence of a clear prohibition against the
wearing of religious garb, and even though
no such regulation as existed in the O'Connor
case presently exists, counsel for the State
Education Department has unofficially advised that the State, since the O'Connor
case has assumed that, as a matter of law,
it is improper to wear such garb in the
public schools.
Between 1918 and 1941, five states considered the problem. In Knowlton v. Baumhover, 182 Iowa 691, 166N.W. 202 (1918),
there was strong dicta against the legality of
wearing religious garb. In State ex rel Public
School District No. 6 of Cedar County v.
Taylor, 122 Neb. 454, 240 N.W. 573 (1932),
the wearing of religious garb was one of the
many factors which induced the court to hold
that the school was sectarian and therefore
not entitled to public funds. In two other cases
[State ex rel. Johnson v. Boyd, 217 Ind. 248,
28 N.E. 2d 256 (1940) and Gerhardt v.
Heid, 66 N.D. 444, 267 N.W. 127 (1936)],
however, the court held that it was not unconstitutional for nuns so garbed to teach in the
public schools. [See also Rogers v. Trustees
of School Dist. No. 2 of Bathhurst, 1 N.B. Eq.
266 (1896)]. In the fifth case, the court declined to pass on the question, preferring to
base its holding on other factors in the case.
[Harfst v. Hoegen, 163 S.W. 2d 609 (Mo.

1941)].
During this period, two other states joined
with Pennsylvania in specifically prohibiting
the wearing of religious garb by any persons
teaching in the public schools. [See Neb. Rev.
Stat. §79-1274 (1950 Reissue); Ore. Rev.
Stat. §342.650 (1953)]. Both statutes provide for the suspension of any teacher violating its provisions and the Nebraska statute
further provides that violation thereof shall
constitute a misdemeanor.
The most thorough discussion of the problem since the decision in the Hysong case in
1894 is found in the recent opinion delivered
by the Supreme Court of New Mexico [Zellers v. Huff, 55 N.M. 501, 236 P. 2d 949
(1951)]. The court there considered in
detail the various statutory and constitutional
provisions involved and reversed the trial
court judgment with reference to the question
of religious garb. In ordering the issuance
of an injunction, the court held that "[n]ot
only does the wearing of religious garb and
insignia have a propagandizing effect for the
church but by its very nature it introduced
sectarian religion into the school."
Despite the strong language of the Zellers
case, the Kentucky Court was apparently
unmoved by the doctrine enunciated therein.
The Rawlings case has not been reported
and, therefore, it is not possible to quote the
Court's opinion.
The Attorney General of Kentucky has
advised that the plaintiffs, although they had
not taken the appeal as of December 1,
1954, have designated the record in the
lower court for appeal.
Bible Distributionin Public Schools
The parents of two students, one Catholic
and the other Jewish, brought an action to
restrain the distribution of the King James
version of the Bible in the public schools of
the borough in accordance with a resolution
of the borough's Board of Education. Subsequent to the institution of the action, the Catholic child transferred to a parochial school
and, since the action became moot as to him,
it was continued solely in the name of the
Jewish parent, Tudor. The Gideons Inter-

national, the non-profit corporation who had
offered to distribute the Bibles, intervened as
a party defendant.
The resolution adopted by the Board of
Education was passed, one member dissenting, over the opposition of a Catholic priest
and Jewish rabbi who attended the meeting.
The resolution provided that the Bibles were
to be distributed to those children whose
parents, by means of a signature request card,
might so wish. Prior to the distribution of the
Bibles, the present action was instituted and
a temporary injunction was granted on Feb.
19, 1952 and continued on Feb. 29, 1952,
restraining the distribution until further determination of the action. After full hearing
on March 30, 1953, the trial judge vacated
the restraining order and, while an appeal
was pending before the Appellate Division
of the Superior Court, the New Jersey Supreme Court ordered certification on its own
motion.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey, finding
as a matter of fact that the King James version
was repugnant to the tenets of both the
Catholic and Jewish religions and therefore
sectarian, reversed the trial court and struck
down the resolution of the Board of Education holding that the distribution of a sectarian book is favoritism and a preference of
one religion over another and therefore violative of the establishment of religion clause
of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution. Tudor v. Board of Education
of Borough of Rutherford, 14 N. J. 31, 100
A.2d 857 (1953).
On May 3, 1954 an appeal was filed in
the United States Supreme Court and on Oct.
14, 1954 that court denied certiorari sub
nom. The Gideons Internationalv. Tudor, 75
Sup. Ct. 25 (1954).
Zoning Restrictions on Churches
A significant case involving the constitutionality of zoning ordinances as applied to construction of churches* is presently sub judice
*For an interesting discussion of the subject, see
Zoning Laws and the Church, 27 St. John's Law
Review 93 (1952).

in Matter of Diocese of Rochester V. Planning
Board of Brighton. (Supreme Court, Monroe
County, N. Y.).
The Town of Brighton, New York, is a
residential community lying east and south
of the city limits of Rochester. Its population,
which has been growing rapidly, is over
23,000, of which more than 6,000 are Catholics. The zoning ordinances of the town
provide that churches and schools may be
erected in residential areas only with the consent of the Town Planning Board.
There is at present only one Catholic parish
in the township, located in the western portion. The church and parochial school are
both badly overcrowded. The Diocese of
Rochester accordingly erected a new parish,
dedicated to St. Thomas More, in the eastern part of the township, and acquired a piece
of property on which to erect a church and
parochial school. Substantially all of the territory of the new parish, and the great majority of the entire township, are zoned as
residential areas. On November 15, 1954, the
Board denied the application of the Diocese,
on the stated ground that it would prefer to
see the property cut up into single-family residence lots which would bring in substantial
taxes.
The zoning ordinance provides for a review of the action of the Planning Board by
the Town Board. The statute provides for a
review by the courts. Because of doubts as
to the proper course to pursue, and in view
of the 30-day limitation provided in Section
267 of the Town Law, the Diocese decided to
pursue both remedies. Its petition for review
to the Town Board was presented on November 26th, but has not yet been acted on. On
December 9th, the Diocese commenced a
proceeding under Article 78, in which it was
joined as petitioner by the Estate of William
A. E. Drescher, present owner of the property, attacking the action of the Planning
Board (a) as an abuse of discretion and (b)
as unconstitutional. The petition is returnable
in Supreme Court, Monroe County on January 11, 1955.

Rectory Held Tax Exempt
St. Stanislaus Kostka Parish owns an
entire city block in Wilmington, Delaware,
on which is located the Church building, a
school, a convent and a rectory. The City of
Wilmington has since 1921 assessed taxes
upon the rectory, which the parish has refused to pay. The Church brought an action
for a judgment declaring the assessments
void. Under the Delaware Code, the rectory
would be exempt from state taxation, but the
Wilmington City Charter does not specifically
exempt such property from municipal taxation. The Court, nevertheless, held that the
rectory was exempted from taxation. In so
holding, the court, following the rationale of
Mayor of Wilmington v. Town Hill School
Ass'n, 2 W.W. Harr. 277, 122 Atl. 442
(1923), indicated that "the General Assembly must be presumed, when it includes
in a city charter the exemption from municipal taxation of such other classes of property
'as may be exempted by law,' to have intended
the city to be bound by the general tax
exemption policy laid down by general law."
Mayor of Wilmington v. Saint Stanislaus
Kostka Church, 108 A. 2d 581 (Del. 1954).

Religion and Adoption Laws
An eight year old child, orphaned as the
result of the murder of her parents, was
placed by a Michigan probate court in the
custody of her deceased mother's sister and
brother-in-law. The decree awarding custody
of the child was granted without a hearing
although it was known that the child's paternal grandmother also sought custody of
the child. Since the decree was granted without complying with the procedural safeguards, the Circuit Court in Michigan, on
appeal, vacated the decree. Thereupon, the
child's paternal grandmother instituted a
proceeding for a writ of habeas corpus in
Pennsylvania, where the infant then resided
with her maternal aunt and uncle, to determine the custody of the child. The trial
court, after careful examination of the evidence, found that both parties were of good
moral character, that both were financially

able to care for the child, and that the
environment in both homes was substantially
the same. Consequently, in awarding custody
of the child to the grandmother, the court
based its decree on kinship and religion. The
court noted that the grandmother was more
closely related to the child than the aunt. It
also observed that the child was Roman
Catholic, and the grandmother was of the
same religious faith. The child's aunt and
uncle, however, were Presbyterians, and
testified that they would raise the child as a
Presbyterian.
Upon appeal, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania reversed the decree. The appellate court stated that religion and kinship
were not controlling factors, and was of the
opinion that it would be better for the child
to live away from the scene of her parents'
murder. It also pointed out that the child's
aunt and uncle were younger than the grandmother, and had several children at about
the same age as the infant. Commonwealth
ex rel. Kuntz v. Stackhouse, 108 A. 2d 73
(Pa. 1954).
On November 1, 1954, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania denied a petition for
an appeal from the judgment of the Superior
Court. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a
petition for reconsideration and were joined
in the petition by the Catholic Children's
Bureau, Inc. By analogy to the provisions
of the Juvenile Court Act of 1933, the
Fiduciaries Act of 1949 and the Adoption
Act of 1953, the court stated that ". . . the
religious faith of the child's parents must be
given very serious consideration in the placing of the child. ..."
Although the court announced its intention not to depart from that principle, it
denied the petitions for reconsideration stating that: "Under the facts of the present
case, however, the Superior Court, which is
vested with jurisdiction in such matters, determined that a paramount and imperative
regard for the welfare of the child required
that it be removed from the locality where
its parents were murdered. Finding in this
exercise of its judgment no violation of the

principle above stated we refused the petition for the allowance of an appeal."
The attorneys for the plaintiff have indicated that they may file a petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States on the ground that the judgment of
the Pennsylvania court violates the Fourteenth Amendment.
Under Massachusetts law, persons wishing
to adopt a child must be, where practicable,
of the same religious faith as the child. If
the child's religion is disputed, he is deemed
to have the religion of his mother. The constitutionality of this law was recently litigated in an adoption proceeding in which a
husband and wife, members of the Jewish
faith, sought to adopt twins, whose mother
and natural father were Catholics. The children, who were not baptized, had lived with
the Jewish couple since they were two weeks
old. The evidence indicated that the couple
would rear the children in the Jewish faith.
The trial court held that the best interests
of the children would not be served by
permitting their adoption by the Jewish
couple, notwithstanding the Catholic mother's
consent to the adoption with the knowledge
that the children would be reared in the
Jewish faith. The trial court also found that
local Catholic agencies had listed many
Catholic couples which could provide the
same material advantages as the Jewish
couple. Upon appeal, the Supreme Judicial
Court affirmed on the ground that the evidence sustained the finding that adoption by
the Jewish couple would not be for the best
interests of the children.
Petitioners argued that the Massachusetts
statute was unconstitutional in that it contravened the First Amendment. In rejecting
the contention that the statute was a law
"respecting the establishment of religion or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof," the
Court pointed out that all religions were
treated equally, and no burden was placed
upon anyone to maintain any religion. The
Court also rejected the argument that there
was interference with the mother's right to
determine the religion of her offspring.

"[T]here is clearly no interference with any
wish of hers as long as she retains her status
as a parent. It is only on the assumption that
she is to lose her status that ...[the statute]
becomes operative. The moment an adoption
is completed all control by the mother comes
to an end." Petitions of Goldman, 121 N.E.
2d 843 (Mass. 1954).
The American Jewish Congress has indicated that a petition for certiorari to the
Supreme Court of the United States will be
filed.
Court Permits Child to
Choose Religion
In a separation action, custody of the
child was awarded to the mother, a Christian
Scientist, with the stipulation that the boy be
reared as a Catholic. At the time of her
marriage to the child's father, a Catholic,
the mother had promised in writing, as required by Church law, that any issue of the
marriage would be reared in the Roman
Catholic faith. Although the child was baptized a Catholic, he was sent, despite his
father's protests, to a Christian Science
Sunday School. The mother thereupon
sought to void the stipulation included in
the separation decree. On the hearing in
1953, the court permitted the child to testify
as to his religious preferences, and, as a
result, voided the stipulation. The Appellate
Division affirmed without opinion. However,
Justices Wenzel and Murphy in a strong
dissent voted to reverse the order and to
deny the motion to modify the judgment,
with the following memorandum: "Appellant and respondent entered into an antenuptial agreement that all children of their
union were to be brought up in the Roman
Catholic faith. The marriage was solemnized
in 1938, and in 1940 a son was born and
baptized as a Catholic. The wife, contrary
to her agreement and her husband's desires,
sent the child to a Christian Science Sunday
school at an early age. The husband and
wife separated in 1947. In 1949, in an
annulment action brought by the husband,
based on the breach of the antenuptial agreement, the wife prevailed on her counter-

claim for a separation. The judgment, however, provided that the child be brought up
in the Roman Catholic religion in accordance
with the agreement of the parties. The wife
has now asked that this judgment be modified so that the boy shall be permitted to
attend the public schools and receive instruction in Christian Science. The modification
of the judgment has been granted in that
respect. In the formative years of a child's
life it must be guided in its religious and
secular education by its parents until its
mind is sufficiently mature to make its own
decisions. That degree of maturity is not
reached at the age of twelve. If, as the mother
claims, the child is now confused, the fault
is entirely hers. She has continuously violated the aforesaid provision in the agreement and the judgment. She should be required to fulfill her promise and the earlier
direction of the court. The tenets of all religions as well as the law require the observance
of a solemn obligation." Martin v. Martin,
283 App. Div. 721, 127 N.Y.S. 2d 851 (2d
Dep't 1954).
On December 31, 1954 the Court of Appeals affirmed in a per curiam opinion. Judge
Desmond dissented in the following opinion
in which Judge Conway concurred.
"I dissent for these reasons:
1. There is no finding and no testimony
that enforcement of the religious training provision of the 1949 judgment (and of the 1938
agreement which it confirmed) would damage, or has damaged, the boy, mentally,
physically or in any other way. All statements
as to his becoming 'unhappy' or 'mentally disturbed' or "ill-adjusted' are taken from the
mother's ex parte affidavit which is a mere
pleading, not proof. Neither the mother, nor
the boy nor anyone else gave any testimony as
to any such mental hurt or disturbance. The
Referee's decision makes no such finding. The
Referee amended the decree solely because,
so he found, this twelve-year-old boy 'has a
mind of his own,' because failure to amend
the decree 'would strip him of his independ-

ent judgment in matters of this kind,' and because (so held the Referee) 'neither the
mother's wishes nor the father's wishes should
control what is to be done here***.' True, at
the end of the decision, the Referee said he
was doing what 'is best for the boy' but it is
impossible to read the decision as based on
anything except the boy's own wishes and his
supposedly mature and considered choice of
a religion for himself. That was not within the
Referee's competency, in the face of a Supreme Court judgment as to the place and
nature of his religious training, based on a
solemn prenuptial agreement.
2. The idea that a child of twelve is competent to make a choice binding on the Supreme Court and on his parents in such a
matter, is not only contrary to our decisions
(see Bunim v. Bunim, 298 N. Y. 391), and
contrary to all human experience, but is directly opposed to the parens patriae public
policy of New York (Citing Statutes).
3. This sort of pre-nuptial agreement is
enforcible like any other, unless and until its
enforcement is shown to be harmful to the
child. 'Agreements between parents for a particular sort of religious upbringing have in
general been held valid in this country' (Weinberger v. Van Hessen, 260 N. Y. 294, 298).
Particularly must this be so when the agreement has been confirmed by, and written into,
a judgment.
4. Although the child's welfare is a paramount consideration in every custody case,
we cannot close our eyes to fundamental principles as to judgments and agreements, and
we cannot forget ancient maxims denying equitable relief to suitors whose hands are unclean. Respondent failed to prove that an
amendment to the decree was suggested by
anything except the boy's own desires. She did
prove affirmatively that she herself had created this troublesome position by violating
not only her solemn agreement, but the plain
condition under which custody was decreed
to her."

